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Abstract
In this paper, I attempt a personal account of my understanding of the
measurement problem in quantum mechanics, which has been largely in the
tradition of the Copenhagen interpretation. I assume that (i) the quantum
state is a representation of knowledge of a (real or hypothetical) observer
relative to her experimental capabilities; (ii) measurements have definite
outcomes in the sense that only one outcome occurs; (iii) quantum theory
is universal and the irreversibility of the measurement process is only “for
all practical purposes”. These assumptions are analyzed within quantum
theory and their consistency is tested in Deutsch’s version of the Wigner’s
friend gedanken experiment, where the friend reveals to Wigner whether she
observes a definite outcome without revealing which outcome she observes.
The view that holds the coexistence of the “facts of the world” common both
for Wigner and his friend runs into the problem of the hidden variable pro-
gram. The solution lies in understanding that “facts” can only exist relative
to the observer.
Two measurement problems
There are at least two measurement problems in quantum mechanics1. The less
prominent of the two (the “small” problem) is that of explaining why a certain
∗Submitted for the proceedings of the Conference Quantum UnSpeakables
II: 50 Years of Bell’s Theorem (Vienna, 19-22 June 2014)
1Two problems are assumed in Ref. [1, 2] and three problems are assumed in Ref. [3].
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outcome – as opposed to its alternatives – occurs in a particular run of an exper-
iment. The bigger problem of the two (the “big” problem) is that of explaining
the ways in which an experiment arrives at a particular outcome. It addresses the
question of what makes a measurement a measurement2.
In the following, I would like to present a personal account of my understand-
ing of the measurement problems in quantum mechanics. My intention is not to
argue that the approach I chose is the “best” way in any particular sense, but rather
to demonstrate its logical consistency and to investigate what consequences the re-
quirement for its consistency have for our understanding of physical reality. I will
first present a probabilistic argument that explains why the measurement process
is irreversible “for all practical purposes”. Furthermore, by analyzing Deutsch’s
version of the Wigner’s friend gedanken experiment, I will show that any attempt
to assume that the measurement records (or “facts” or experiences) that coexist
for both Wigner and his friend will run into the problems of the hidden variable
program, for which I propose a Bell-type experiment. The conclusion is that these
records can have meaning only relative to the observers; there are no “facts of the
world per se”.
Although I see my view of the quantum measurement problem broadly in the
tradition of the Copenhagen interpretation, particularly within the information-
theoretical approach to quantum mechanics [4], it contains elements from Qbism [5],
the relative interpretation of Rovelli [6] and even the many-worlds interpretation.
This indicates that the various interpretations might have much more in common
than their supporters are willing to accept.
The solutions to the small measurement problem which have been offered to
date basically present two underlying premisses. They either introduce “hidden”
causes that determine which outcome will occur in a given experimental run (as in
Bohm’s hidden-variables theory), or they refute the basic notion of measurements
resulting in definite outcomes (as in the Everett interpretation). None of that is
really necessary. My position is that measurements have definite outcomes in
the sense that only one outcome can be the result of a single experimental run.
This is rather obvious. If it were otherwise, the notion of measurement would
become ambiguous. If the outcome is not definitive, then no observation has
occurred. This, however, does not exclude the possibility that the conditions that
define a measurement are fulfilled for one observer but not for another. As far
2The proposed formulation of the two problems is inspired but not equivalent to the one of
Ref. [1, 2] where the two categories of measurement problems were first introduced with the
designations “small” and “big”.
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as discussions of the small measurement problem are concerned, I fail to see the
reality of that problem. If one accepts the possibility of quantum probabilities
being fundamentally irreducible, this problem vanishes.
Let me explain that in more detail. Within quantum theory, a description of
the quantum state of a system and of the measurement apparatus allows us to
calculate the probability p(a|x) to observe outcome a, for a measurement choice
x. The probabilities are “irreducible” if there are no additional variables λ in the
theory, which potentially are yet to be discovered, such that when one conditions
predictions on them, one has either P(a|x, λ) = 1 or 0, i.e. they allow the outcome
to be predicted perfectly3. Not only quantum mechanics, but every probabilistic
theory in which probabilities are taken to be irreducible “must have” the small
measurement problem. (The “hypothetical collapse” models [8, 9, 10] that pre-
dict the breakdown of quantum-mechanical laws on a macroscopic scale, if not
supplemented by non-local hidden variables, also fall into this category.) The lack
of the small measurement problem in the probabilistic theories would contradict
the very idea of having irreducible probabilities 4.
The big measurement problem is more subtle. It can be illustrated by the
following situation. As students, we are taught that there are two processes a
quantum state can undergo. First, the deterministic, unitary, and continuous time
evolution of the state (of a system, possibly together with its environment) that
obeys the Schroedinger equation or its relativistic counterpart. Second, the prob-
abilistic, non-unitary, and discontinuous change of the state, called “projection”
3The notion of irreducibility can be weakened to the requirement that the predictions con-
ditioned on the variables are not more informative about the outcomes of future measurements
than the predictions of quantum theory [7]. Formally, for every measurement, the probability
distribution conditioned on the variable cannot have lower (Shannon) entropy than the quantum
probability distribution.
4The so-called “non-local” features of quantum theory are not a subject of the present article.
I should, however, like to mention that once one accepts the notion that probabilities can be ir-
reducible, there is no reason to restrict them to be locally causal [11], i.e. to be decomposable
as: p(a, b|x, y) = ∫ dλρ(λ)P(a|x, λ)P(b|y, λ), where x and y are choices of measurement settings in
two separated laboratories, a and b are respective outcomes and ρ(λ) is a probability distribution.
It appears that the main misunderstanding associated with Bell’s theorem stems from a failure to
acknowledge the irreducibility of quantum probabilities irrespectively of the relative experimental
space-time arrangements [12]. Bell’s local causality accepts that probabilities for local outcomes
can be irreducibly probabilistic, but requires those for correlations to be factorized into (a convex
mixture of) probabilities for local outcomes. There is no need for imposing such a constraint on
a probabilistic theory, where probabilities are considered to be fundamental. Rather, the notion
of locality should be based on a operationally well-defined no-signaling condition, and it is this
condition whose violation is at odds with special relativity.
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or “collapse”, brought about by measurement. Equipped with this knowledge,
we attend a practical training in a quantum optics laboratory, where we see vari-
ous pieces of equipment, such as photonic sources, beam-splitters, optical fibers,
mirrors, photodiodes, phase shifters etc., for the first time. The instructor sets us
the task of computing the evolution of the photonic quantum state in the set-up
prepared on the optical table. We soon realize that we are in trouble. There is
nothing in the theory to tell us which device in the laboratory corresponds to a
unitary transformation and which to a projection! We start to ask questions. What
makes a photodiode a good detector for photons? And why is a beam splitter a bad
detector? At least manufacturers of photon detectors should know the answers to
these questions, shouldn’t they? Or perhaps the measurement is not completed in
the detector, but only when the result is finally recorded in a computer, or even in
the observer’s mind? Bell sardonically commented [11]: “What exactly qualifies
some physical systems to play the role of ’measurer’? Was the wave function of
the world waiting to jump for thousands of millions of years until a single-celled
living creature appeared? Or did it have to wait a little longer, for some better
qualified system ... with a Ph.D.?”
One possibility to address these questions would be to dismiss the big mea-
surement problem as a pseudo-issue, just as we did for the small one. If quantum
theory is understood as a fundamental theory of observations and observers’ ac-
tions upon these observations, then measurement can be introduced as a primitive
notion, which cannot be subject to a complete analysis, not even in principle. At
most, one could motivate it informally, through an appeal to intuition and every-
day experience. It seems to me that this path is taken by some proponents of
the Copenhagen interpretation and Quantum Bayesianism (QBists), for example
when Fuchs and Scheck write [13] “a measurement is an action an agent takes
to elicit an experience. The measurement outcome is the experience so elicited”.
Such a view is consistent and self-contained, but in my opinion, it is not the whole
story. It is silent about the question: what makes a photon counter a better device
for detecting photons than a beam splitter? Yet the question is scientifically well
posed and has an unambiguous answer (which manufacturers of photodetectors
do know!).
I would like to express clearly that I do agree with the Qbists and the Copen-
hagenists on the necessity of a functional distinction between the object and the
subject of observation. This distinction is at the heart of Bohr’s epistemologi-
cal argument that measurement instruments lie outside the domain of the theory,
insofar as they serve their purpose of acquiring empirical knowledge. Regret-
fully, this argument has repeatedly been misinterpreted in textbooks and articles
4
and “replaced by the crude physical assumption that macroscopic systems behave
classically, which would introduce an artificial split of the physical world into
a quantum microcosms and a classical macrocosms.” [14]. The “cut” is not be-
tween the macro and micro worlds but between the measuring apparatus and the
observed quantum system. It is of epistemic, not of ontic origin.
Bohr and Heisenberg seem to have disagreed about the movability of the
cut [15]. As Heisenberg recalls in his letter to Heelan [16] (quoted in Ref. [15]):
“I argued that a cut could be moved around to some extent while Bohr preferred
to think that the position is uniquely defined in every experiment”. In my under-
standing, the two views are not conflicting and can be brought into accordance.
Heisenberg acknowledges the universality of the laws of quantum mechanics in
the sense that every system, including the measuring instrument, is in principle
subject to these laws. Of course, in moving the cut, the measurement instrument
loses its function as a means for acquiring knowledge about a quantum system but
becomes itself a quantum system – an object that can be observed by a further set
of measurement instruments. Bohr, however, believes “that for a given (my italics)
experimental setting the cut is determined by the nature of the problem ...”, as he
writes in a 1935 letter to Heisenberg [17] (quoted in Ref. [15]). The cut is hence
movable in principle, but is fixed in any concrete experimental set-up. Still, we
might wonder what fixes the position of the object–instrument cut in a concrete
experimental set-up? Here, Bohr encounters the big measurement problem.
The question of the meaning of the quantum state is closely related to the mea-
surement problem(s). Which approach one takes in addressing the later depends
on the specific view one has on the former. The next section is devoted to this
question.
What is the quantum state?
The discussion over the meaning of quantum states is often presented as a conflict
between two fundamentally opposed approaches. The first approach speaks of
“states of reality” that are independent of any empirical access, and implicitly
assumes the existence of such states. The second approach refers to observations,
and what we can know about them and deduce from them. This approach requires
differentiation with regard to the question “Knowledge about what?”. Insofar as
the quantum state is seen as representing the observer’s incomplete knowledge
about an assumed “state of reality”, it is not fundamentally dissimilar to the first
approach. This is why, to use modern terminology, the distinction between a
realist interpretation of a quantum state that is “psi-ontic” and one that is “psi-
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epistemic” [18] – which actually is a distinction between two kinds of hidden
variable theory – is only relevant to supporters of the first approach.
An alternative exists. The quantum state can be seen as a mathematical repre-
sentation of what the observer has to know in order to calculate probabilities for
outcomes of measurements following a specific preparation. However, one could
also object to this “operationalist’s view”. Malin phrased it nicely [19]: “What
if the knower is a physicist who had a martini before trying to ’know’? What
if a person who knows just a little physics learns of the result? What if he had
a martini? Somehow we feel that such questions are irrelevant.” He continues:
“To avoid difficulties of this kind regarding the epistemic interpretation, we can
consider a quantum state as representing not actual knowledge (which requires a
knower), but the available or potential knowledge about a system.”
Of course, the argument that quantum theory does not apply in the absence
of observers has not been made. Yet when calculating a quantum state, it might
help to think of a hypothetical observer for whom the quantum state stands for her
knowledge 5. For example, when quantum cosmologists talk about the pressure of
a primordial state of the universe, we can make sense of it if we imagine a well-
defined experimental procedure a hypothetical observer could apply on the state
to provide an operational meaning to the term “pressure”. The ultimate meaning
is presented by current cosmological observations, based on which we reconstruct
the idea of the early universe’s pressure. (The observer here is always considered
to be external to the universe. The “wave function of the universe” that would
include the observer is a problematic concept, as it negates the necessity of the
object–subject cut.). This is compatible with Malin’s view [19] that “quantum
states represent the available knowledge about the potentialities of a quantum sys-
tem, knowledge from the perspective of a particular location in space”, not of any
actual observer.
I share Malin’s view on the meaning of the quantum state, which is essentially
the one supported by Copenhagenists and Qbists. I would like to add just one, but
an important, aspect to this view: The quantum state is a representation of knowl-
edge necessary for a hypothetical observer – respecting her experimental capabil-
ities – to compute probabilities of outcomes of all possible future experiments. An
explicit reference to the observer’s experimental capabilities is crucial to address
the big measurement problem. The “knowledge” here refers to Wigner’s defini-
5Peres correctly notes that considering hypothetical observers is not a prerogative of quantum
theory [21]. They are also used in thermodynamics, when we say that a perpetual-motion machine
of the second kind cannot be built, or in the theory of special relativity, when we say that no signal
can be transferred faster than the speed of light.
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tion of the quantum state [22]: “... the state vector is only a shorthand expression
of that part of our information concerning the past of the system which is relevant
for predicting (as far as possible) the future behaviour thereof.”
The available experimental precision will in every particular arrangement de-
termine to which objects the observer can meaningfully assign quantum states.
This agrees with Bohr’s view “that for a given experimental setting the cut is de-
termined by the nature of the problem ...” That there is nothing in the theory that
would prohibit reaching the necessary experimental precision to allow a meaning-
ful state assignment to objects of increasingly large sizes – eventually as large as
our measurement devices – reflects Heisenberg’ view that the “cut can be shifted
arbitrarily far in the direction of the observer”, as he wrote in an unpublished pa-
per [23] from 1935, in which he outlined his response to the Einstein, Podolsky,
and Rosen paper from the same year6. The measurement instrument and the ob-
server can be included in the quantum mechanical description, and then observed
by someone else, a “superobserver”, for whom the original measurement instru-
ment loses its previous status as a means for acquiring knowledge. For this pur-
pose, she needs another set of “superinstruments” that are superior to the original
instruments regarding their precision.
FAPP irreversibility
The distinct outcomes of a measurement apparatus are associated with “macro-
scopically distinct states”. (Only in that aspect does “macroscopicity” play a role
in the measurement process.) These are defined as states that can still be differ-
entiated even in those cases where the measurements are imprecise and coarse-
grained. If, for example, just a few spins of a large magnet are flipped, then the
entire quantum state of the magnet will change into an orthogonal one. Yet, at
our macroscopic level, we will still perceive it as the very same magnet. In order
for the change to become noticeable even in a coarse-grained measurement, the
quantum states of a sufficiently large number of spins need to be changed.
6In the same paper, Heisenberg concludes: “... the quantum mechanical predictions about the
outcome of an arbitrary experiment are independent of the location of the cut ...” This can be
seen as a consequence of “purification” in quantum theory, which states that every mixed state of
system A can always be seen as a state belonging to a part of a composite system AB that itself
is in a pure state. This state is unique up to a reversible transformation on B. The assumption of
purification is one of the central features of quantum theory, which, taken as an axiom together
with a few other axioms, makes it possible to explain why the theory has the very mathematical
structure it does [26].
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In order to quantify the distinguishability of such macroscopic states, con-
sider a spin- j system, with j  1, and the coarse-grained measurements with the
POVM elements
PΩ0 =
2 j + 1
4pi
"
Ω0
dΩ|Ω〉〈Ω| (1)
as a model example, where |Ω〉 = ∑+ jm=− j ( 2 jj+m)1/2 cos j+m θ2 sin j−m θ2e−imφ0 |m〉 is the
spin coherent state and θ and φ are the polar and azimuthal angles respectively,
corresponding to the solid angle Ω. The size of the integration region around the
solid angle Ω0 = (θ0, φ0) is taken to be such that its projection ∆m along the z axis
is much larger than the intrinsic uncertainty of the coherent states7, ∆m  √ j.
Under the coarse grained measurement, any state ρˆ can effectively be described in
terms of a positive probability distribution (the well-known Q-function) [27].
Q(Ω) =
2 j + 1
4pi
〈Ω|ρˆ|Ω〉. (2)
Specifically, the probabilities for the POVM outcomes can be obtained by averag-
ing the Q-function: PΩ0 =
!
Ω0
Q(Ω). Hence, the description in terms of Q(Ω) is
effectively classical and it leads to the classical limit of quantum mechanics8 [27].
7When we introduce coarse-grained observables, we need to define the states that are “close”
to each other to conflate them into coarse-grained outcomes. However, the terms “close” or “dis-
tant” make sense in a classical context only. There, “close” states correspond to neighboring
outcomes in the real configuration space. For example, the coherent states conflated in the single
outcome Ω0 of the POVM all correspond to approximately the same direction Ω0 in real space.
Therefore, certain features of classicality need to be presumed before macroscopic states can be
defined. An alternative would be the attempt to reconstruct the notions of closeness, distance,
and space – and consequently, also the theories referring to these notions, such as quantum field
theory – from within the formalism of the Hilbert space only. Useful tools for this attempt might
be preferred tensor factorizations, coarse-grained observables, and symmetries. The results of
Refs. [24, 25] present first progress towards this goal. The most elementary quantum system, the
qubit, resides in an abstract state space with SU(2) symmetry. This is locally isomorphic to the
group SO(3) of rotations in three-dimensional space. Considering directional degrees of freedom
(spin), this symmetry is found to be operationally justified in the symmetry of the configuration of
macroscopic instruments used for transforming the spin state. Hereby one assumes that quantum
theory is “closed”: the macroscopic instruments do not lie outside of the theory, but are described
from within it in the limit of a large number of its constituents (as coherent states or “classical
fields”) [25].
8The classical world arises from within quantum theory when neighboring outcomes are not
distinguished but bunched together into slots in the measurements of limited precision. What
would the classical world look like if non-neighboring outcomes were conflated to slots? To ad-
dress this question, one could imagine an experiment on a person whose nerve fibers behind the
8
Since Q(Ω) represents a complete description of the system under coarse-grained
measurements, I will call it the “macroscopic state”. This approach to classical-
ity differs conceptually from and is complementary to the decoherence program
that is dynamical and describes correlations of the system with other degrees of
freedom which are integrated out [28].
A measure of the distinguishability between two probability distributions P(Ω)
and Q(Ω) is the Euclidean scalar product (P,Q) :=
!
dΩ
√
P(Ω)Q(Ω). If two
probability distributions are perfectly distinguishable (P,Q) = 0, while if they are
identical (P,Q) = 1. Consider two pure quantum states |ψ1〉 and |ψ2〉 with the Q-
functions |〈ψ1|Ω〉|2 and |〈ψ2|Ω〉|2, respectively. Then 2 j+14pi
!
dΩ |〈ψ1|Ω〉||〈Ω|ψ2| ≥
2 j+1
4pi |
!
dΩ〈ψ1|Ω〉〈Ω|ψ2〉| = |〈ψ1|ψ2〉|, where 2 j+14pi
!
dΩ|Ω〉〈Ω〉 = 11. This shows
that distinguishability between the quantum states and distinguishability between
macroscopic states are two different notions. The latter implies the former, but
the opposite is not true. Say, spin j is composed of N spins-1/2. In this case,
a number of spins of the order of
√
N need to be flipped in order to arrive at
a macroscopically distinct state. Only then do we perceive it as a new state of
magnetization. It is now a new “fact”.
The macroscopic states are robust. This means that they are stable against per-
turbations, which may for example be caused by repeated coarse-grained observa-
tions. In other words, the Q-function before and after a coarse-grained measure-
ment is approximately the same [29]. It therefore becomes possible for different
observers to repeatedly observe the same macroscopic state. The result is a cer-
tain level of intersubjectivity among them. If we assume, however, that quantum
mechanics is universally valid, then it is in principle possible to undo the entire
measurement process. Imagine a superobserver who has full control over the de-
grees of freedom of the measuring apparatus. Such a superobserver would be able
to decorrelate the apparatus from the measured system. In this process, the infor-
mation about the measurement result would be erased. Seen from this perspective,
“irreversibility” in the quantum measurement process merely stands for the fact
that it is extremely difficult – but not impossible! – to reverse the process. It is
retina are disconnected and again reconnected at different, randomly chosen, nerve extensions con-
necting to the brain. It seems reasonable to assume that the neighboring points of the object that is
illuminated with light and observed by the person’s eye will no more be perceived by the person as
neighboring points. One may wonder if, in the course of further interaction with the environment,
the person’s brain will start to make sense out of the seen “disordered classical world”, or if it will
post-process the signals to search for more “ordered” structures as a prerequisite for making sense
out of them. The latter may eventually nullify the effect of the random reconnection of nerves, and
the person will again perceive the ordinary classical world.
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irreversible “for all practical purposes” (or “FAPP,” to use Bell’s acronym).
I have often heard the following objection to FAPP: No matter how low the
probability is to reverse the evolution in the measurement process, it is still there.
How is it possible to settle the question of what actually exists by an approxima-
tion? In my eyes, such questions do not take into consideration the simple fact
that quantum theory cannot be both, universal and not irreversible merely FAPP.
While on the one hand, measurements have to result in irreversible facts (other-
wise, the notion of measurement itself would become meaningless, as no mea-
surement would ever be conclusive), this irreversibility on the other hand must
be merely FAPP if quantum theory is in principle applicable to any system. Any
system means that the measuring apparatus itself can also be subject to the laws
of quantum theory. My main point is the following. While it is obviously pos-
sible to describe the subject as an object, it then has to be the object for another
subject. In my eyes, not enough thought has gone into the fundamental nature of
FAPP. More research on the philosophy of FAPP, if you like, should be done by
philosophers of physics. This, in my eyes, would contribute to the resolution of
the problem in a much deeper way than the perpetual attempts to expel this term
from the foundations of physics based on presupposed philosophical doctrine.
Detection devices, such as photographic plates or photo-diodes, consist of a
large number of constituents in a certain “metastable state”. Their interaction
with the observed quantum systems brings them into a “stable state” that can be
distinguished from the initial one even under coarse-grained observations. This
transition is signified by the “click” in the detector or a new position of the pointer
label. In both the metastable and the stable state, the constituents of the instru-
ment can be in any of a large number of quantum states that correspond to the
respective macroscopic states. In order to understand how irreversibility FAPP is
possible, it is crucial to realize that not only the initial and final quantum states
of the instrument are imprecisely known, but also the full details of the interac-
tions (i.e. Hamiltonian) among its constituents and with the environment. Even if
it were possible to know the initial and final states precisely, the lack of precise
knowledge of these interactions prevents us from reversing the measurement pro-
cess. Moreover, a photodetector does not spontaneously “de-click”. It does not
turn itself back into the initial metastable state and and it does not emit the photon
into its initial state.
The irreversibility of the measurement process might be explained in quantum
mechanical terms, but as metastable and stable states of the detector are macro-
scopic states, a classical explanation of irreversibility is sufficient. In fact, noth-
ing “quantum” is indispensable for “solving” the big measurement problem. The
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“problem” is essentially present in classical measurements as well.
For classical (chaotic) systems, the physical state after a certain time can be-
come unpredictable if the solutions of dynamical equations are highly sensitive,
either to initial states or to uncontrollable external perturbations of the Hamilto-
nian. The situation is different in quantum mechanics because of the unitarity
of the dynamical evolution: the scalar product between the unperturbed and the
perturbed state is constant such that an uncertainty in initial states will not grow
in time. However, an uncontrollable external perturbation to the Hamiltonian can
explain FAPP irreversibility for both the classical and quantum case. Below I
consider one such model.
Consider the detection device to be a classical dynamical system for which
the state xt at an arbitrary time t is given in terms of a flow xt = ft(x0) on the
initial state x0 = (q,p), where q are the positions and p the momenta of all the
system’s constituents. The flow is assumed to be reversible, i.e. there exists the
involution pi(q,p) = (q,−p) with pi2 = 11 for which for all times pi ftpi = f −1t .
We now choose two regions A and B of the phase space. We assume a uniform
probability distribution of the state over A to exist at the outset. The probability
of finding the state in the set B at the time t when, at the time t = 0, the state was
in the set A is given by the volume fraction of the states from A that evolves in B.
Prob[xt ∈ B|x0 ∈ A] = |A ∩ f
−1
t B|
|A| . (3)
Here, |X| is the Lebesgue measure of set X. In the remaining argument I will
assume that B = ftA, for which the probability (3) is 1.
Suppose now that we want to reverse the evolution, but do not have precise
control of the flow ft, for example due to uncontrollable influences from the
environment. Hence, the inverse flow f ′t , ft is perturbed, where we assume
pi f ′t pi = f
′−1
t . At the time t, we inverse all the momenta and set the time again to
0 for simplicity. (Note that inverting momenta does not require measuring them,
which would be impossible due to the limited precision of the instruments, nor
does it require to know them precisely. An arrangement with elastic bounce of the
molecules would be sufficient [30]. If f ′t = ft, it would be sufficient to inverse the
momenta to perfectly reverse the evolution.) Then, the probability to find the state
in the set piA at the time t when, at time t = 0, the state was in the set piB = pi ftA is
given by
Prob[xt ∈ piA|x0 ∈ pi ftA] = |pi ftA ∩ f
′−1
t piA|
|pi ftA| =
| ftA ∩ f ′t A|
|A| , (4)
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Figure 1: Schematic illustration of the phase space evolution in both the regular and the
chaotic case. An infinitesimal element A of volume (∆x0)n, where n is the dimension of
the phase space, evolves in ftA under a regular flow or in f ′t A under a chaotic flow. The
volume of the overlap between the two evolved elements has the linear size of ∆x0 along
all directions of divergence and eλit∆x0 (λi < 0) for every direction i of contraction.
where we used |piX| = |X| and the Liouville theorem | ftX| = |X|. (Once one arrives
at the states from the set piA, one can obtain those from the initial set A by simply
inverting the momenta. This might induce additional imprecisions, neglected here
for simplicity.) The expression (4) has an operational meaning, namely that of the
“probability for reversing the evolution”. It is the probability to find the system in
the initial state under first the forward, and then the reverse, perturbed, flow.
The classical explanation of irreversibility is based on the notions of mixing
and coarse graining. Mixing is a property of chaotic systems for which at least
one of the Lyapunov exponents is positive. (If the system is a Hamiltonian system,
the sum of all Lyapunov exponents is zero. If the system is dissipative, the sum
is negative.) Two trajectories in phase space with an initial separation ∆x0 along
dimension i diverge at a rate given by ∆xt ≈ eλit∆x0, where λi > 0 is a Lyapunov
exponent. Suppose that |A| = (∆x0)n corresponds to the small volume that can still
be distinguished from other such volumes in a coarse-grained observation, and n
is the dimension of the phase space. Furthermore, suppose that ft is regular and
does not significantly change the form of A, while f ′t is chaotic. One has for the
phase space volume | f ′t A| ≈ e
∑n
i λi(∆x0)n. Then the probability (4) is specified by
the volume | ftA ∩ f ′t A| of the largest overlap between the volume elements ftA
and f ′t A. This volume has the linear size ∆x0 along all directions of stretching and
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eλit∆x0 along every direction i of contraction. Hence, the probability is bounded
as
Prob[xt ∈ piA|x0 ∈ pi ftA] ≤ e−
∑′
i λit, (5)
where the sum
∑′
i is over positive Lyapunov exponents. The probability of revers-
ing the evolution and arriving at the initial state is negligibly small after several
multiples of the characteristic time t ∼ 1/∑′i λi. The above argument can explain
the classical irreversibility of macroscopic states in detection instruments, but for
completeness, I will below present a quantum version for it.
One can define a quantum mechanical measure of the state revival when an
imperfect time-reversal evolution is applied to a quantum system. We will il-
lustrate this with an example of a spin system. Suppose that an initial quantum
state |ψ〉 evolves during a time t under a Hamiltonian H0 into the final state |ψ(t)〉.
The two states define macroscopic states (Q-functions) P(Ω, 0) = |〈Ω|ψ〉|2 and
P(Ω, t) = |〈Ω|ψ(t)〉|2, respectively. Any attempt to reverse the evolution and arrive
back at the initial macroscopic state will result in an application of a perturbed,
slightly different Hamiltonian Hˆ = Hˆ0 + Vˆ with perturbation Vˆ . Perfect recovery
of macroscopic state could be achieved only if one could have a sufficient control
over Hˆ. In a realistic situation, however, such a control is FAPP impossible.
As a measure of reversibility we use the scalar product
(P,Q) =
"
dΩ
√
P(Ω, 0)Q(Ω, t) (6)
between the probability distribution P(Ω, 0) = |〈Ω|ψ〉|2 of finding initially the
system in a macroscopic “phase point” Ω and the probability distribution
Q(Ω, t) = |〈Ω|e iHˆt~ e −iHˆ0t~ |ψ〉|2 (7)
of finding it there after a combined evolution: forward evolution in duration of t
under the Hamiltonian Hˆ0 and then backward evolution in duration of t under −Hˆ.
The combined evolution embodies the notion of time-reversal. If for some t > 0,
one has (P,Q) ≈ 1, the evolution is reversed at the macroscopic level. (Note that
the reversed quantum state e
iHˆt
~ e
−iHˆ0t
~ |ψ〉 does not need to be identical to the initial
one |ψ〉 to have reversibility at the macroscopic level. It is only important that they
approximately correspond to the same macroscopic state.)
Consider for simplicity a non-degenerative Hamiltonian Hˆ0 with eigenstates
|α0〉 for eigenvalues E0α, and the perturbed Hamiltonian Hˆ with eigenstates |α〉 for
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eigenvalues Eα. For simplicity, I assume an extremely weak perturbation Vˆ for
which Eα = E0α + 〈α0|Vˆ |α0〉 and 〈α|β0〉 = δα,β0 . Expanding |ψ〉 =
∑
α ψα|α〉, one has
Q(Ω, t) =
∑
α,β
ψαψ
∗
β〈Ω|α〉〈β|Ω〉e
i(Vα−Vβ)t
~ , (8)
where Vα := 〈α|Vˆ |α〉.
The value of (8) depends on the statistical distribution of Vα−Vβ over different
perturbations [31]. This means that in every repetition of our procedure the system
will be differently perturbed during its backwards evolution. For chaotic systems,
one assumes that this distribution is governed by a random matrix theory [32]. Ac-
cording to this theory, Vα are independent random numbers, and for a large num-
ber of eigenstates, the distribution can be approximated by a Gaussian one g(Vα) =
1√
piσ
e−
(Vα−Wα)2
σ2 around the mean value Wα. Taking an ensemble average over differ-
ent perturbations, one obtains 〈e iVαt~ 〉pert =
∫ ∞
−∞ dxg(x)e
ixt
~ e
iWαt
~ = e
iWαt
~ e−
σ2t2
4~2 . In the
model the distribution spread σ is taken to be much smaller than the level spacing
to ensure no correlations in the distribution, 〈e i(Vα−Vβ)t~ 〉pert = 〈e iVαt~ 〉pert〈e
−iVβt
~ 〉pert.
Finally, we obtain
〈Q(Ω, t)〉pert =
∑
α,β
ψαψ
∗
β〈Ω|α〉〈β|Ω〉e
i(Wα−Wβ)t
~ e−
σ2t2
2~2 = |〈Ω|φ(t)|2e−σ
2t2
2~2 , (9)
where in the final step we introduce φα(t) := ψαe
iWαt
~ and |φ(t)〉 := ∑α φα(t)|α〉.
Using 〈 √Q(Ω, t)〉pert ≤
√〈Q(Ω, t)〉pert one obtains for the measure of re-
versibility
〈(P,Q)〉pert ≤
"
dΩ|〈Ω|ψ〉||〈Ω|φ(t)〉|e−σ
2t2
4~2 ≤ e−σ
2t2
4~2 . (10)
We see that for random perturbations on average the macroscopic state will signif-
icantly change after first forward evolution in duration of time t, and then reverse
evolution in duration of time t, if t > ~/σ, indicating FAPP irreversibility. Specif-
ically, for t → ∞, one has 〈(P,Q)〉pert → 0. The regime beyond the validity
of weak perturbation can be treated using the results from the field of quantum
chaos [33].
For the present distribution over perturbations both the evolution of the macro-
scopic state and of the quantum state is FAPP irreversible. One can find, however,
such distributions for which the evolution of the macroscopic state is reversible
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and the evolution of the quantum states is irreversible FAPP, but we will not anal-
yse them here further.
We conclude that the lack of the complete knowledge of the Hamiltonian cir-
cumvents the time reversal objection, also known as Loschmidt’s paradox, which
states that it should not be possible to deduce time irreversibility from an under-
lying time reversal theory. A similar argument could be applied to address the
recurrence objection, which is based on the Poincare´ recurrence theorem, that all
finite systems are recurrent, i.e. return arbitrarily close to their initial state after
a possibly very long time. Results show that recurrence times in the dynamics of
quantum states could be extremely large [34]. A comprehensive study of various
models of quantum measurement can be found in Ref. [35]
Deutsch’s thought experiment
In Ref. [36], Deutsch proposed an experiment which he claims can distinguish
experimentally between the Copenhagen and the Everett interpretations of quan-
tum mechanics. While I do not in any way see the necessity of assuming that the
two interpretations might have distinct predictions in the experiment, I acknowl-
edge that the experiment most strikingly demonstrates the necessity of a radical
revision of our attitude to physical reality in quantum physics.
The thought experiment involves measurements on the observer by another,
superobserver, and is a variant of the Wigner’s-friend thought experiment [37].
Four systems are involved in the experiment as illustrated in Fig. 2. System 1 is
a spin-1/2 atom which passes through a Stern-Gerlach apparatus in such a way
that the two trajectories, corresponding to outcomes “spin up” and “spin down”,
pass over systems 2 and 3. These two systems, also spin-1/2 atoms, represent
part of the observer’s “sense organ”. Their receptive states at the outset are “spin
down”. They are coupled with atom 1 in such away that when atom 1 follows the
“spin up” trajectory, it passes over atom 2. The spin of atom 2 now flips to “spin
up”. Meanwhile, the spin of atom 3 remains the same. If in a similar way atom
1 follows the “spin-down” trajectory, the spin of atom 3 will flip while the spin
of atom 2 will remain unchanged. System 4 is the observer, and it couples only
to sense organs 2 and 3. Potentially, there are further systems that constitute an
environment of the four systems. They all are isolated from the rest in a sealed
laboratory. The experiment is then performed a sufficient number of times to
collect statistics.
Initially, the state of the four systems is factorized with atom 1 in state |x+〉1 =
1√
2
(|z+〉1 + |z−〉1) and the observer in some definite state, |0〉4, whose exact prop-
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Figure 2: Deutsch’s version of the Wigner’s friend gedanken experiment. An observer
performs the Stern-Gerlach experiment on a spin-1/2 atom (system 1) in a closed labo-
ratory. The outcome “spin up” or “spin-down” is recorded in sense organs, which are
also spin-1/2 atoms (systems 2 and 3,) and finally in the observer’s brain (system 4). The
outside observer, the superobserver, describes the experiment as a coherent evolution of a
large entangled state. The observer communicates a message to the superobserver outside,
which contains information about whether she sees a definite outcome or not, without re-
vealing which outcome she sees. What will the observer then experience? Would the
superobserver in principle be able to perform an interference experiment on the systems
and the observer and confirm the appropriateness of his state assignment?
erties do not need to be specified, except that she is capable of completing a mea-
surement:
|ψ(0)〉 = 1√
2
(|z+〉1 + |z−〉1)|z−〉2|z−〉3|0〉4. (11)
One can also consider mixed states, but this assumption would complicate the sit-
uation unnecessarily. The Stern-Gerlach magnet is assumed to be oriented along
the z-axis. After atom 1 has passed through the Stern-Gerlach apparatus and has
interacted with the sense organs at time t, the state is
|ψ(t)〉 = 1√
2
(|z+〉1|z+〉2|z−〉3 + |z−〉1|z−〉2|z+〉3)|0〉4. (12)
Finally, after the interaction between the observer and the sense organs at time t′,
the state becomes
|ψ(t′)〉 = 1√
2
(|z+〉1|z+〉2|z−〉3|knows “up”〉4 + |z−〉1|z−〉2|z+〉3|knows “down”〉4),
(13)
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where |knows “up”〉4 and |knows “down”〉4 denote the observer’s states after record-
ing the result. If there are further systems in the laboratory, their states can even-
tually also get correlated with the two amplitudes in Eq. (13) in a huge entangled
state. Unless stated otherwise, I will assume that there are no further systems in
the laboratory.
Strictly speaking, the quantum state (13) can have an operational meaning
only for the superobserver, who is stationed outside the sealed laboratory. To him
on the outside, on the basis of all the information that is in principle available to
him and conditioned on having sufficient experimental capabilities, the physical
description of the state in the laboratory will be the superposition (13). He can
test the validity of the state assignment by performing an interference experiment
with the output states:
|ψ+〉 = 1√
2
(|z+〉1|z+〉2|z−〉3|knows “up”〉4 + |z−〉1|z−〉2|z+〉3|knows “down”〉4)
|ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|z+〉1|z+〉2|z−〉3|knows “up”〉4 − |z−〉1|z−〉2|z+〉3|knows “down”〉4).
This requires a special experimental arrangement and instruments of high mea-
surement precision, which allow measuring the systems’ and the observer’s brain
states in coherent superpositions.
What will the observer in the laboratory perceive in state (13) after complet-
ing of her measurement? Will she definitively know if she has observed one sin-
gle outcome or not? It is tempting to answer such questions within the standard
quantum framework: Within the laboratory, the actual observation projects the
quantum state into one of the two possibilities. The observer will therefore ei-
ther observe outcome “spin up” or outcome “spin-down”. We know that for the
projection to occur, it is not necessary for the observer to actually read out the
information from the measurement device; it is sufficient that the information is
available in principle [38]. Then, if the superobserver were to project his state onto
the basis of “all information that is in principle available” to him, would that not
include information that is available to the observer? Should the mere availability
of the information about the outcome somewhere – specifically, in the observer’s
brain – not collapse the quantum state that the superobserver assigns? Or does the
observer observe some kind of “blurred reality”, while the superobserver keeps
describing the situation in terms of the superposition state? Deutsch’s ingeniously
contrived experiment could answer these questions at least in principle, albeit its
execution is impractical.
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The idea is that the superobserver could learn whether the observer has ob-
served a definite outcome, without himself learning which outcome she has ob-
served. It is enough for the observer to communicate “I observe a definite out-
come” or “I observe no definite outcome” to the superobserver. (For this purpose,
the laboratory may be opened to pass only this message, keeping all other degrees
of freedom still fully isolated. While being practically demanding, this is possible
in principle.) The message could, for example, be written on a piece of paper and
passed on to the superobserver. The key element of the experiment is that the mes-
sage contains no information about which outcome has occurred and thus should
not lead to a collapse of the quantum state assigned by the superobserver. Imagine
that the observer encodes her message in state |message〉5 of system 5. This state
is factorized out from the total state, |ψ(t′)〉 = 1√
2
(|z+〉1|z+〉2|z−〉3|knows “up”〉4 +
|z−〉1|z−〉2|z+〉3|knows “down”〉4) |message〉5, and thus the communication of the
message does not destroy the superposition.
What will be written in the message? Will the superobserver see the interfer-
ence? Three different results of the experiment are possible9:
1. The quantum state collapses due to a breakdown of the quantum-mechanical
laws when applied to states of brain or to systems of sufficiently large
size, mass, complexity, and the like. The collapse models Ghirardi-Rimini-
Weber [8] or Diosi-Penrose [9, 10] fall into this category. One could also
argue in favor of the collapse within the view according to which a quantum
state is a representation of the observer’s knowledge. Every measurement
yields new information, and the representation of this knowledge update
is the state projection. Since the new information about the outcome is
available somewhere – specifically in the observer’s brain – the state has to
collapse for all observers, including the superobserver10. Independently of
the specific rationale behind the state collapse, the observer sends the mes-
sage that she observers a definite outcome. The superobserver concludes
that although he could exclude all known effects caused by conventional
decoherence, the state is not in the superposition. This he can confirm in the
9In a quantum mechanical experiment, the “observer” could be simulated by a qutrit with
the following encoding [40]: |0〉 for “knowing spin up”, |1〉 for “knowing spin down” and |2〉
for “I see no definite outcome”. The message is then encoded either in |2〉 or in a state with
the two-dimensional support spanned by vectors |0〉 and |1〉 (for example 12 (|0〉〈0| + |1〉〈1|). The
superobserver applies the measurement with the projectors Pˆ1 = |0〉〈0| + |1〉〈1| and Pˆ2 = |2〉〈2|.
10It seems to me that Deutsch had this particular view in mind when he claimed that the Copen-
hagen interpretation predicts the occurrence of the collapse. I see this view at most as a variant of
the interpretation and (to my knowledge) not widely spread.
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interference experiment by observing that both outputs in the interference
experiments occur with equal probability.
2. The superobserver’s state assignment is the superposition state, and the ob-
server perceives a “blurred reality” that she associates with not seeing a
definite outcome. She sends a message: “I observe no definite outcome”.
The superobserver confirms the superposition state in the interference ex-
periment by observing a single output state in the interference experiment.
I personally have trouble to make sense of this option. If quantum theory
describes an observer’s probability assignments in well-defined experimen-
tal procedures, where, to quote Bohr [41] “... by the word ’experiment’ we
refer to a situation where we can tell others what we have done and what we
have learned ...”, then experience of “blurred reality” seems to be outside of
the standard quantum framework. Moreover, such a situation would install
a fundamental asymmetry between the observers, those who see and those
who do not see “blurred reality”.
3. The quantum laws are unmodified. The superobserver’s state assignment is
the superposition state. And yet, the observer observes a definite outcome.
The assigned superposition state can be confirmed in the interference exper-
iment.
In my eyes, outcomes 1 and 2 would indicate fundamentally new physics. I
will not consider these cases further and regard quantum theory to be a universal
physical theory. This leaves us with situation 3 as the only possible outcome
of Deutsch’s thought experiment. The outcome is compatible with the Everett
interpretation: each copy of the observer observes a definite but different outcome
in different branches of the (multi)universe. The outcome is compatible with the
Copenhagen interpretation too, but it is rarely discussed what the implications of
this claim are for our understanding of physical reality within the interpretation.
The rest of the current manuscript is devoted to this problem.
Note that in situation 3 of the thought experiment, the two observers have com-
plementary pieces of information. Taken together, they would violate the comple-
mentarity principle of quantum physics. The observer has complete knowledge
about the value of observable A1 with eigenstates |z+〉1|z+〉2|z−〉3|knows “up”〉4
and |z−〉1|z−〉2|z+〉3 |knows “down”〉4, whereas the superobserver has complete
knowledge about the value of observable A2 with eigenstates |ψ+〉 and |ψ−〉. The
two observables are non-commuting. One might be tempted to interpret outcome
19
3 of Deutsch’s experiment as implying that the two pieces of information coex-
ist. After all, the superobserver has evidence – in form of the message – that the
observer had perfect knowledge about A1. And yet, on the very same state (13),
he can learn the value of A2. Even the observer herself, retrospectively, after
completion of the interference experiment, can be convinced that there is a dis-
crepancy between her message and the fact that she always ends up in one output
state in the interference experiment (thereby forgetting which outcomes she had
observed). This is because, if she previously were in a state observing a defi-
nite outcome, then by applying standard quantum mechanical predictions on the
systems and herself (which in itself is a problematic step because it ignores the
necessity of the object-subject cut), she should have equal probability to end up in
either of the two output states.
The trouble with the assumption that values for A1 and A2 coexist is that it
introduces “hidden variables”, for which a Bell’s theorem can be formulated with
its known consequences. To this end, consider a pair of superobservers, Alice and
Bob, who reside in their local laboratories and conduct an experiment involving
observers Anton and Bertlmann, respectively, who in turn each perform a Stern-
Gerlach experiment of the type explained above. More specifically, Alice has four
systems in her laboratory: atom A1, sense organs A2 and A3, and observer Anton
A4. Similarly, Bob has four systems: atom B1, sense organs B2 and B3, and
observer Bertlmann B4. Suppose that the two superobservers share an entangled
state:
|ψ〉AB = 1√
2
(|Aup〉|Bdown〉 − |Adown〉|Bup〉), (14)
where
|Aup〉 = |z+〉A1|z+〉A2|z−〉A3|Anton knows “up”〉A4,
|Adown〉 = |z−〉A1|z−〉A2|z+〉A3|Anton knows “down”〉A4,
|Bup〉 = |z+〉B1|z+〉B2|z−〉B3|Bertlmann knows “up”〉B4,
|Bdown〉 = |z−〉B1|z−〉B2|z+〉B3|Bertlmann knows “down”〉B4.
Using these states, one can define observables that are analogues to spin projec-
tions along the z and x axes of a spin-1/2 particle, respectively: Az = |Aup〉〈Aup| −
|Adown〉〈Adown|, Ax = |Aup〉〈Adown| + |Adown〉〈Aup| for Alice, and similarly for Bob.
Note that eigenstates of Az correspond to the observer’s states “knowing the spin-z
to be up” and “knowing the spin-z to be down”, and those of Ax to the possible
outcomes of the superobserver’s interference experiment.
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Figure 3: Bell’s experiment to exclude the coexistence of “facts” (i.e. measurement out-
comes or records) for both the observer and the superobserver. Alice and Bob (both of
them superobservers) reside in their space-like separated laboratories in which two further
observers, Anton and Bertlmann respectively, perform a Stern-Gerlach type of measure-
ment. By choice of local measurement setting (1 or 2), each of the superobservers can
either interrogate which outcome the respective observer in his laboratory has observed or
perform the interference experiment jointly on the observer and the spin. With a suitable
entangled state 14, the superobservers can violate Bell’s inequality.
Let us assume that in the Bell experiment, Alice chooses between two mea-
surement settings A1 = Az and A2 = Ax and Bob between B1 = 1√2 (Bz + Bx) and
B2 = 1√2 (Bz − Bx). In a local (deterministic) hidden variable theory, one assumes
that there jointly exist predetermined values for A1, A2, B1 and B2 which are +1
or -1. It is a well-known fact that state (14) with the chosen settings leads to a
violation of the Bell-Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt inequality |〈A1B1〉 + 〈A1B2〉 +
〈A2B1〉 − 〈A2B2〉| ≤ 2, where 〈AiB j〉, i, j = 1, 2, is the correlation function. The
maximal quantum value for the Bell expression is 2
√
2. Just like in every other
Bell test, we conclude that the definite values for the observables cannot coexist
if one keeps the assumption of locality11. We conclude that the two pieces of in-
formation, one of the observer and another of the superobserver, cannot be taken
to coexist.
What consequences does outcome 3 of Deutsch’s thought experiment have
for our understanding of physical reality? Let us assume that the observers’
and superobservers’ laboratories contain a large number of degrees of freedom
which allow the information about respective measurement records to be FAPP
11Here “locality” means that, for example, value A1 depends only on the local setting of Alice
and not on the distant one of Bob. In a non-local hidden variable theory, we would need to
distinguish between A11 and A12, depending on whether Bob’s setting is 1 or 2, respectively. It
is not necessary to assume local deterministic values to derive Bell’ inequalities. Bell’s local
causality is sufficient [11]. This however does not change the conclusions [12].
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redundantly imprinted in their respective “environments”. I will call these records
“facts”. This could be a click in a photodetector, a certain position of a pointer
device, a printout of a computer or a written page in the lab-book, or a definite
human brain state of a colleague who read the lab-book. If we assume that all
these records in the observer’s laboratory get correlated with the spin atoms and
her brain state, and the superobserver can still perform the interference experi-
ment, the result of which is also recorded in his laboratory, one has to accept that
the two pieces of information can redundantly be imprinted in two environments:
the sealed laboratory and the outside, respectively. As long as there is no commu-
nication on the relevant information (the actual measurement outcome) between
the two laboratories, they will remain separate.
If we respect that there should be no preferred observers, then there is no
reason to assume that the “facts” of one of them are more fundamental than those
of the other12. But then, the observers’ records cannot be comprised as “facts of
the world”, independent of the “environment” in which they have occurred. Any
attempt to introduce “facts of the world per se” would run into problems of the
hidden variable program.
The implications of the present Bell experiment are stronger than those of the
standard Bell test. In the latter, we can exclude the view according to which the
outcomes for measurements are (locally) predetermined, no matter if any mea-
surement – and no matter which measurement – is actually performed. Still, be-
tween the partners there is no ambiguity with respect to whether measurements
take place and about the coexistence of their records. The records can be accom-
plished as “facts of the world”, which they share and even need to communicate
in order to evaluate the experimental bound of the Bell expression. This is no
longer the case in the present Bell experiment. What the Bell experiment excludes
is the coexistence of the “facts” themselves. Everettians solve this by assum-
ing that mutually complementary facts never coexist in between two branchings
of the (multi)universe. Copenhagenists (can) take the position that there are no
facts of the world per se, but only relative to observers. This is similar to Quan-
tum Bayesianism, which treats the state of a quantum system as being observer-
dependent, and to Rovelli’s relational quantum mechanics [6], according to which
12One might be tempted to assume that the “facts” of the superobserver are the “real” ones,
as he definitely has more reliable measurement instruments than the observer. This view cannot
withstand the objection that the superobserver himself might be an object observed by yet another
observer, the supersuperobserver, who describes the interference experiment of the superobserver
quantum mechanically. The regression of increasingly more powerful observers might eventually
find its end in a universe with a finite amount of resources.
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“quantum mechanics is a theory about the physical description of physical sys-
tems relative to other systems ...” There are, however, important differences.
In Rovelli’s relational interpretation, the “observer” does not “make any ref-
erence to a conscious, animate, or computing, or in any other manner special,
system” [6] – each system provides its own frame of reference relative to which
states of other systems can be assigned. Taking this position and outcome 3 of the
Deutsch’s experiment and applying them to, for example, the interference phe-
nomenon in the double-slit experiment with single electrons, one would conclude
that, although the observer has no path information, the electron itself “knows”
which path it takes. Relative to the electron, a definite path is taken, although we
as observers observe an interference pattern. Obviously, we are here encounter-
ing the limits of meaningful language when we associate the terms “knowledge”
or “taken” to single electrons. In this respect, quantum theory (in my eyes) re-
mains a fundamental theory of observations in which a (hypothetical) observer,
measurement and probabilities play a central role.
The two dominant approaches to the probability interpretation are the frequen-
tist approach and the Bayesian approach. Qbism views the quantum state to be a
user’s manual – a mathematical tool that an observer uses to make decisions and
take actions on the surrounding world upon observations. Central to this position
is a Bayesian or personalist probabilistic approach to the probabilities that appear
in quantum theory. To me, however, the problem of probability interpretation is
prior to quantum theory, the solution of which alone will not be able to answer the
question: What are the invariant features that characterize quantum theory in ways
that are not relative to observers? By taking the subject matter of quantum theory
to be restricted to an individual agent’s decisions and experiences, Qbism runs into
the danger of denying any objective elements in the notion of the quantum state.
I agree with the Qbist’s notion of subjective quantum states as representatives of
an agent’s beliefs, but only to the extent where a fundamental limit on maximal
possible degree of belief of any agent is respected. This limit is represented FAPP
by a pure quantum state. The fact that the predictions of agents cannot be “im-
proved” over and above this limit in my eyes indicates that probabilities are not
just personal and subjective, but also formed by the aforementioned invariant fea-
tures of the theory. The role of reconstructions of quantum theory is to identify
these invariants13.
13In recent years, there have been several attempts to account for the origin of the basic prin-
ciples from which the structure of quantum theory can be derived without invoking mathematical
terms such as “rays in Hilbert space” or “self-adjoint operators.” [42, 43, 44, 26]
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The difference to the Everett interpretation is more evident. In the view adopted
here, no meaning is given to “the universal wave function”, nor is there an attempt
to arrive at the probabilities from within such a concept alone. Here, the proba-
bilities are always given by the Born rule, which is part of the formalism. This
applies also to superobservers of any order: probabilities acquire meaning only
when the measurement arrangement is specified, in which these probabilities are
observed.
Finally, I comment on the view [45] that the cut cannot be moved to include
measurement instruments, observers etc. as objects under observation, since an
object can never grow up to the point that it includes measurement contexts that, in
turn, are unavoidably given in terms of classical concepts in accordance to Bohr’s
doctrine [39]: “However far the (quantum) phenomena transcend the scope of
classical physical explanation, the account of all evidence must be expressed in
classical terms.” According to this view [45], the necessity of unambiguous usage
of classical concepts fixes the object-subject cut whose position is therefore funda-
mental and equal for all observers. Consequently, one can retain the objectivity of
the “facts of the world”. I do not think that this view stands up to closer scrutiny.
The description of any quantum mechanical experiment is expressed “in common
language supplemented with the terminology of classical physics” [46]. Although
this observation has played an important role in clarifying misconceptions in de-
bates over the interpretation of quantum theory, it is in retrospective rather self-
evident. For example, the description of a double-slit experiment with atoms, in-
cludes the depiction of the source of atoms directed towards the diaphragm normal
to the beam, where the diaphragm contains two slits and a photographic plate with
a characteristic interference pattern on the plate where the atoms are deposited. By
extending the experiment to larger and larger systems, eventually as large as mea-
surement instruments, nothing should change in the epistemic basis of the theory:
we will still give an unambiguous account of the phenomenon in terms of clas-
sical language including a suitable “source”, “beam” and “observation screen”.
This should not be confused with the impossibility of giving a classical explana-
tion of the phenomenon, e.g. in terms of well-defined classical trajectories, which
is present both for atoms and for macroscopic objects. To conclude, the cut can
be shifted with no change in the epistemic foundation of the theory. Negating
this would either mean negating Wigner-type experiments as legitimate quantum
mechanical experiments or predicting outcome 1 in Deutsch’s experiment. Both
choices indicate an acceptance that quantum theory is not universal.
The above-mentioned Bell’s theorem for “facts” implies a striking departure
from naive realism. This brings us to the question of the role of our physical
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theories. If physical theories do not describe “physical reality per se”, what do
they describe then? A possible answer is given by Bohr as communicated by
Petersen [47]:“It is wrong to think that the task of physics is to find out how
nature is. Physics concerns what we can say about nature”.
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